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VOLUNTARY ACTION OF A FIRM ON ENVIROMENT MANAGEMENT:  
AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT ON SRI LANKAN FOOD PROCESSING FIRMS’ 
RESPONSE TO THE PRIVATE AND REGULATORY INCENTIVES  
 




The effect of a set of private/market (i.e. financial implications, internal efficiency, market 
response)  and  public/non-market  (i.e.  government  regulation,  judiciary/legal  system) 
incentives for a firm to act voluntarily on environmental quality is examined. It uses the 
levels  of  adoption  of  five  solid  waste  management  practices  [SWMPs],  namely:  (1)  3R 
system; (2) Composting; (3) Good manufacturing practices; (4)  Biogas unit, and (5) ISO 
14000 by food processing sector in Sri Lanka in response to the prevalence of each incentive 
at the firm as the case. The data collected from 325 firms through in-depth interviews and site 
inspections and supported by a validated structured questionnaire were analyzed using the 
principles of Structural Equation Modeling. The “Analysis of Moment Structures” (AMOS) 
software was used to establish the relationships between the levels of adoption of SWMPs 
and the strength of each incentive. The results show that firms‟ response to environment is 
relatively low, i.e. 49.2% did not adopt a single practice, while only 28%, 12%, 7.4%, 3.1% 
and 0.3%, respectively, have adopted 1, 2, 3, 4 or all practices. Firms tend to adopt a higher 
number of SWMPs as the relative strength of an each incentive perceived by the decision 
maker of firm gets increases. Firms put a higher weight on the impact on regulation and legal 
system than the private incentives and the firm size has a substantial impact on its response to 
the  environment.  The  results  highlight  the  importance  of  bringing  the  current  public 
regulatory regimes in developing countries like Sri Lanka towards co-regulation, which is 
practiced by developed countries like Australia and Canada to facilitate businesses to come 
up with own solutions for environmental and food quality, as the outcome of this analysis 
points out that firms‟ compliance to the recommended SWMP was not triggered satisfactorily 
by the private/voluntary action.    
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Environment management, Food processing sector in Sri Lanka, Incentives, Regulation, Solid 
waste management, Voluntary adoption 
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Introduction 
 
The recent literature on environmental economics shows that market-based actions are, in 
general,  more  effective  than  government-oriented  "first  best"  solutions  to  deal  with  the 
problems associated with public goods. In the context of environmental policy, however, it is 
difficult to formulate a set of appropriate policies that can be put into practice at the firm 
level, due to the limited knowledge of the level and nature of economic incentives available, 
in both a market and non-market context, for firms to comply with and/or adopt such controls 
at the firm level (Khanna, 2001; Segerson and Miceli, 1998).  
 
The focal point of interest of this research study was to examine this economic problem from 
an empirical point of view using data from the food processing sector in Sri Lanka, which 
contributes about 4.5 percent to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Sri Lanka and is 
responsible for around 30 percent of the total manufacturing value-added in Sri Lanka and the 
recent statistics show that the generation and accumulation of solid waste from this sector has 
become a growing problem of immense magnitude in Sri Lanka. According to the Database 
of  Municipal  Solid  Waste  in  Sri  Lanka,  published  by  the  Ministry  of  Environment  and 
Natural Resources (MENR) in Sri Lanka, four out of the nine provinces of Sri Lanka (i.e., 
Western, Southern, Central and North-Western) are responsible for the generation of more 
than 80 percent of the solid waste at the municipal level by both households and industries. 
 
The  legal  framework  required  for  SWM  in  Sri  Lanka  is  provided  under  the  Local 
Government Act. The local authorities are charged in terms of the act with the responsibility 
of collection and disposal of solid waste at the municipal, urban and pradeshiya sabha or 
local government level. Despite all the formal regulations in place, many stakeholders in the 
food processing sector claim that the implementation and effective enforcement of formal 
regulations aiming the management of solid and liquid waste generated in this sector is very 
poor since regulations themselves vary significantly across local authorities as well as at the 
level of the provincial governments. 
  
Taking this  fact  into consideration, the  MENR is  in  the process  of designing policies to 
encourage  firms  to  adopt  effective  and  sustainable  solid  waste  management  practices 
(SWMP) through waste avoidance/reduction, reuse and recycling, and final disposal in an 
environmentally sound manner. The MENR under its recently formulated “National Strategy Page 4 of 19 
for Solid Waste Management” has introduced a number of specific procedures that firms in 
the food processing sector should adopt in order to mange the solid waste generated in a firm, 
including, amongst the others: (1) “Sorting of waste based on 3R System” – Establishment of 
necessary infrastructure facilities in appropriate places and allocating labor for the purpose; 
(2) “Composting” – The conversion of solid waste materials into composts, in which the 
heavy  metal  composition  should  be  maintained  below  the  recommended  standards;  (3) 
“Biogas technology” – Establishing units in accordance with the guidelines provided by the 
Ministry, and further the firms can obtain guidelines, proper training, and certification to 
adopt environmentally sound practices such as (4) a set of “Good Manufacturing Practices” 
(GMP), and (5) “ISO 14000 Environmental Management System”. Nevertheless, the adoption 
of these practices at the level of firm is not mandatory, thus, an individual business can select 
either one or a combination of these practices or any other appropriate mechanism that they 
deem to be effective in rectifying the problems associated with the generation of waste in 
their premises.  
 
There  is  scarcity  of  literature  that  paid  attention  to  evaluating  the  ability  of  voluntary 
environmental programs to generate economic benefits for firms. Yet, given their voluntary 
nature, provision of economic benefits to firms is a necessary condition for these programs to 
become  effective  environmental  policy  instruments.  However,  little  is  known  about  why 
firms operating in developing countries would participate in these initiatives. The outcomes 
of few such studies are provided below to provide an insight into the problem discussed in 
this paper.  
 
Hettige et al. (1996) test the importance of plant characteristics, economic considerations and 
external  pressure  in  determining  the  environmental  performance  of  firms  in  Bangladesh, 
India, Indonesia and Thailand using evidence drawn from plant-level abatement practices. 
The results suggest that pollution intensity is negatively associated with scale, productive 
efficiency  and  the  use  of  new  process  technology  while  it  is  strongly  and  positively 
associated with public ownership. Amongst the external sources of pressure, the presence or 
absence of community action (informal regulation) emerges as a clear source of interplant 
difference.  Pargal  and  Wheeler  (1996)  examined  the  impact  of  informal  regulation  on 
industrial pollution in the context of Indonesia using data from 243 firms from the different 
sectors. Based on an economic framework explaining the relationship between environmental 
demand and supply under informal regulation, the study shows that in the absence of without Page 5 of 19 
any  formal  regulations,  equilibrium  levels  of  emissions  vary  strongly  across  firms  and 
regions in response to differences in scale, regional input prices, firm characteristics and the 
degree of informal regulation by local communities. According to this study, firm and plant 
characteristics appear to have an impact on pollution intensity.  It shows firms in the food and 
paper sectors to have the highest pollution intensity.  
           
Blackman and Bannister (1997) carried out an econometric analysis to determine the role of 
community  pressure  and  clean  technology  among  traditional  brick  makers  in  Mexico. 
According to the major findings of the study: (i) it is possible to successfully promote the 
adoption of a clean technology by intensely competitive informal firms even when the new 
technology  significantly  raises  variable  costs,  and  (ii)  community  pressure  applied  by 
competing firms and private-sector local organizations can generate incentives for adoption. 
On the presumption that command and control environmental regulation has failed to achieve 
efficient  solutions,  Blackman  and  Harrington  (1999)  reviewed  the  prospects  and 
consequences of using certain economic incentives in developing countries to combat air 
pollution. They discussed the advantages and disadvantages of using a number of instruments 
of  economic  incentives,  including  the  emission  fees,  tradable  permits  and  environmental 
taxes in Sweden, the United States, China, and Poland for this purpose, and asserted that both 
design  deficiencies  and  pervasive  constraints  on  monitoring  and  enforcement  impede  the 
effectiveness of such instruments in these countries. They it concludes that tradable permits 
are generally not practical while emission fee policies may probably be more appropriate.  
 
Dasgupta et al. (2000) examine the effects of regulation, plant-level management policies and 
several  other  factors  on  the  environmental  compliance  of  Mexican  manufacturers.  They 
found that while many firms in Mexico avoid complying with regulations because of sporadic 
monitoring  and  enforcement,  others  over-comply  with  the  regulations  because  their 
abatement decisions are strongly affected by extra legal factors. They capture both these 
possibilities  in  a  model  of  decision-making  under  uncertainty,  which  shows  that  a  firm 
minimizes  expected  pollution-related  costs  by  setting  emissions  intensity  (i.e., 
emissions/output) at the point where the marginal  abatement  cost  (MAC) is  equal  to the 
expected marginal penalty (EMP) for polluting. In a similar study, Blackman et al. (2000) 
calculate the benefits and costs of pollution control in the informal sector of Mexican brick 
kilns and found that a number of control strategies produce very significant net benefits. They 
concluded therefore that informal polluters should be a priority for environmental regulations. Page 6 of 19 
 
Rivera (2002) provides cross-sectional empirical evidence about the participation of hotels in 
the Costa Rican Certification for Sustainable Tourism (CST program), which is probably the 
first performance-based voluntary environmental program created by a developing country 
government.  The  outcome  of  analysis  indicates  that  hotels  with  certified  superior 
environmental performance show a positive relationship with differentiation advantages that 
yield price premiums. Participation in the CST program alone is not significantly related to 
higher prices  and higher sales. The evidence also  indicates that participation in  the CST 
program was significantly related to government monitoring, trade association membership 
and hotels focus on “green consumers”. Potoski and Prakash (2004) examined the cross-
national divergence in adoption rates of ISO 14001 based on the data from 59 countries and 
found that  the adoption rates were likely to be higher in countries whose trading partners 
have adopted this non-governmental regime, which are embedded in international networks 
of  non-governmental  organizations,  whose  governments  flexibly  enforce  stringent 
environmental  regulations  with  a  less  adversarial  and  litigious  stance  towards  firms,  and 
where consumers want mechanisms for identifying environmentally progressive firms.  
 
Blackman et al. (2008) used plant-level data from more than 60,000 facilities to identify the 
drivers of participation in Mexico‟s Clean Industry Program. It suggests that the threat of 
regulatory sanctions drives participation in the program and the program did appear to attract 
relatively dirty firms. It also found that plants that sold their goods in overseas markets and to 
government suppliers, used imported inputs, were relatively large, and were in certain sectors 
and states were more likely to participate in the program, all other things equal. Powers et al. 
(2008) used a detailed plant-level survey data to evaluate the impact of India‟s Green Rating 
Project (GRP) on the environmental performance of the country‟s largest pulp and paper 
plants. It found that the GRP drove significant reductions in pollution loadings among dirty 
plants  but  not  among  cleaner  ones.  Further,  it  stated  that  the  plants  located  in  wealthier 
communities were more responsive to GRP ratings, as were single-plant firms.  
 
In light of this, the specific objectives of the study are, therefore, to identify and quantify the 
extent to which a system of economic incentives that comprised of both market and non-
market  incentives  motivate  food  processing  firms  in  Sri  Lanka  to  adopt  various 
environmental controls  aiming solid waste management (SWM) at  the firm  level,  and to 
assess the impact of firm and of market-specific characteristics of firms on this behavior.  Page 7 of 19 
   
Methods 
 
Econometric Specification of the Model 
 
It could be assumed that the environmental policy of a firm that works to create a „waste-free 
non-polluted environment‟ is characterized by the utility function Ui = u [v (DiIji, Fki)] of the 
decision maker/management of the firm i (where i = 1, 2, 3…n) and u (v) is concave on its 
arguments. The management of the firm is responsible for complying with the regulatory 
requirements of the government. At the same time, the firm may decide to adopt various 
types of strategies voluntarily to manage the waste generated in the firm. Consequently, the 
term v in the above equation represents the overall gains to the firm through its responsible 
behavior towards the quality of environment where it operates (Caswell et al., 1998; Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Segerson, 1999; Williamson, 1986). 
 
It could in turn be stated that the degree of responsiveness of a firm towards the environment 
is  reflected  by  the  types  of  levels  of  environmental  management  controls  and  practices 
(SWMPi) adopted by the firm i, which depend on the individual incentives faced by the 
decision maker/management in this respect (Iji), where j = types of incentives (j = 1, 2, 3…m).  
The relative strength of an individual incentive (j) on this behavior possesses a relationship 
with characteristics of the firm (Fki), where k = size and type of the firm, etc. Given the above 
notations, through the maximization of the utility function, the following regression form of 
an expression for an empirical analysis (where i is an error term) can be derived: 
 
SWMPi = i + jIji + kFki + I      (1) 
 
Equation (1) expressed above can be extended to specify the following econometric model 
(see, Nakamura et al., 2001): 
 
SWMPi = 0 + 1 * CSTi + 2 * INEi + 3 * MRFi + 4 * REFi + 
1 * FTi + 2 * FSi + 3 * VTi + 4 * EXi + i    (2) 
 
where:  SWMPi  denotes  the  dependent  variable  (i.e.,  solid  waste  management  practices 
adopted by a firm). The right hand side variables include: 0 = intercept, j = coefficients of 4 Page 8 of 19 
individual  incentives  (j  =  1,  2,  3  and  4)  considered  in  the  analysis  such  that  CST  = 
cost/financial implications; INE = internal efficiency (both human resource and technical); 
MRF = market forces (i.e. sales & revenue, reputation, and commercial pressure), and REF = 
regulatory forces (i.e. existing and anticipated government regulations, liability laws), and k 
= coefficients of characteristics of a firm (Fki) such that FT = firm type; FS = firm size (based 
on  annual  returns);  VT  =  vintage,  and  EX  =  export  orientation  (Caswell  et  al.,  1998; 
Jayasinghe-Mudalige and Henson, 2006a; 2006b; Khanna and Anton, 2002; Segerson, 1999).  
 
Specification of the Dependent Variable (SWMPi) 
 
For the purpose of this analysis, it was presumed that the number of SWMPs adopted by a 
firm reflects its degree of responsiveness towards environmental quality, since the MENR 
does not suggest any recommended order in which to adopt the practices listed above in a 
food processing firm and none of which is endowed with a higher value over the others. 
Under these circumstances, there is a possibility that certain firms may decide to adopt a 
single or two practices at a time, whereas others may even go beyond (i.e., four or five) 
depending on the gains to the firm by doing so. On the other hand, there may be firms that do 
not adopt a single practice out of the list given above. In such case, an analyst may come up 
with a series of zeros as she works on a scale of: Adoption = 1; Non-adoption = 0 to report the 
status of adoption of these practices in the firm on an individual basis. At times, the analyst 
may therefore experience excess zeros. Principles of Count Data Regression models were 
hence employed to estimate the coefficients of the econometric model specified above, which 
uses the number of SWMPs adopted by a firm as the estimable dependent variable (SWMPi) 
(Chowdhury and Imran, 2010). 
 
Specification of Explanatory Variables (Iji) 
 
It is unable to include the 4 individual incentives listed above directly into the econometric 
model  specified  as  its  explanatory  variables,  mainly  due  to:  (a)  Mutual  Exclusivity  and 
Endogeneity  –  the  prevalence  of  an  individual  incentive  as  an  element  of  the  system 
(Nakamura et al., 2001; Shavell, 1987); Subjectivity – the management of the firm perceives 
these incentives in terms of potential benefits and costs to the firm (Buchanan, 1969); and 
Unobservability  –  the  management  cannot  directly  observe  the  nature  of  the  incentives Page 9 of 19 
prevailing at the firm level (Hair et al., 2006). In order to overcome these difficulties, the 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) techniques [i.e., a multivariate data analysis technique 
that comes under Structural Equation Modeling (SEM)] were employed to develop estimable 
variables for the 4 individual incentives (j = 1, 2…4), which combines the features of two 
models: (i) Measurement Model, and (ii) Structural Model into a simultaneous statistical test 
(Hair et al., 2006; Hughes et al., 1986). The  MM specifies a series  of relationships that 
suggests how „measured variables‟ represent a Latent Construct. The measured variables of a 
Construct included in the MM are, in turn, referred to as Indicators that reflects exactly the 
observable characteristics of the firm with respect to the Construct that underlines it. In this 
study,  the  four  individual  incentives  are  such  latent  variables  and  are  defined  as  Latent 
Constructs  of  the  MM.  In  turn,  a  set  of  „attitudinal  statements‟  reflecting  observable 
characteristics of these incentives were specified as the Indicators of the model. Once the 
Constructs  and  their  corresponding  Indicators  are  identified,  the  Analysis  of  Moment 
Structures (AMOS) [version 16] statistical software was performed to construct the MM as 












































































































Figure 1: Measurement Model in SEM (Using AMOS) Page 10 of 19 
 
The scores provided by respondents to each  Indicator on the multi-point likert-scale was 
analyzed with the AMOS and the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) [version 14] 
to get rid of the empirical issues cited above (i.e., non-exclusivity, endogeneity, subjectivity, 
unobservability,  etc.)  by  applying  a  number  of  statistical  tests  specified  under  the  CFA, 
including: (a) Construct/Scale Reliability – measures whether a set of Indicators representing 




and is customary to use the Cronbach‟s alpha () (Cronbach, 1951) for this purpose. Since 
the  aim  of  the  test  is  to  maximize  ,  researchers  generally  accept  values  above  0.7  as 
demonstrating  that  a  scale  is  internally  consistent;  (b)  Unidimensionality  –  evaluated  by 
examining the loading of Indicators on to factors with a view to determining whether one 
broad or several specific constructs characterize the set of Indicators, and is common to use 
the Principal Axis Factoring Technique to examine this effect (De Vellis, 1991), where a 
minimum value of around 0.30 to 0.35 indicates that an Indicator loads onto a factor (Spector, 
1992), and (c) Construct Validity – the ability of Indicators of a Construct to accurately 
measure the concept under study (De Vellis, 1991). The Multi-Trait Multi-Method matrix 
(MTMM  matrix),  introduced  by  Campbell  and  Fiske  (1959)  is  used  to  assess  Construct 
Validity, which reports the correlation between different Constructs used in the analysis and 
an  alternative  measure  used  to  evaluate  the  same  phenomenon  (e.g.,  Validation  Items) 
(Henson and Traill, 2000).  
 
Once the valid and reliable Indicators of each Construct were chosen through CFA, the scores 
given by respondents to these indicators on the multi-point likert-scale were considered as 
objective measurements or, in other words, free from those empirical issues listed elsewhere, 
and proceed with further analysis. The scores given by respondents [i.e., every firm included 
in the sample (i = 1, 2…n)] were then used to the Indicators of a Construct (i.e., attitudinal 
statements of an individual incentive) in order to derive an index for the respective incentive 
(j = 1, 2…4) – referred to here as Incentive Index (Iji) – by taking the aggregate of the scores 
given by a respondent to all Indicators of an incentive on the 5-point Likert Scale (AIS) and 
dividing it by the Maximum Potential Score (MPS) to normalize the value of the Incentive 
Index so that its value ranges from -1 (minimum) to 1 (maximum) as: Iji = Aggregate Score 
(AGS) / Maximum Potential Score (MPS).  
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Collection and Analysis of Data  
 
The data from 325 food processing firms belonging to five key sub-sectors based on the type 
of  product:  (1)  processed  fruits  and  vegetables  (PFV)];  (2)  coconut  products  (COP);  (3) 
essential oils (ESO); (4) non-alcoholic beverages (NAB), and (5) other processed products 
(OPP), located in four provinces [i.e., Western (WP), North Western (NW), Central (CP) and 
Southern (SP)] were used. The contact details of firms were obtained from the Municipal 
Council (for urban-based factories) and at pradeshiya sabha (for rural-based factories) levels 
and the Export Development Board of Sri Lanka; the Ministry of Industrial Development; the 
Federation  and  Regional  Chambers  of  Industry  and  Commerce;  National  Agribusiness 
Council of Sri Lanka, and Fruit and Vegetable Processors Association of Sri Lanka etc.  
 
A  series  of  in-depth  face-to-face interviews were carried out  supported by the structured 
questionnaire, which was piloted using 36 firms, with the top-most executives followed by an 
inspection of the site for cases where permission was granted from January to September 
2009.  Each  respondent  was  first  asked  to  rate  his/her  perception  about  the  observable 
characteristic  explained  in  each  statement  (i.e.,  Indicator)  with  respect  to  the  current 
performance of his/her firm on a two-point Likert scale, i.e., (1) agree (“yes”), or (2) disagree 
(“no”) having instructed the respondent to rate the same statement on a five-point Likert-
scale by taking into account of the extent to which he/she agrees (if they say “yes” in the 1
st 
rating)  or  disagrees  (if  they  say  “no”  in  the  1
st  rating)  with  this  particular  statement 
(Oppenheim, 1992).  
 
The  Measurement  Model  (MM)  constructed  through  the  Analysis  of  Moment  Structures 
(AMOS) [version 16] software (see Figure 1) using the Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
(MLE), considering the recommendations of Hair et al., (2006) to assess the validity of MM 
in terms of both Model Fit and Construct Validity. The summary of goodness-of-fit measures 
obtained highlights that the overall model X
2 is 1901.67 with 824 degrees of freedom (df). 
The probability value associated with this result is 0.000 and the model is significant at  = 
0.001.  Also the ratio of X
2/df was 2.308 (i.e., 1901.67/824), which was below the accepted 
cut-off value of <3.00. At the end of this process, all the attitudinal statements included in the 
questionnaire were considered to derive the Incentive Index of each incentive.  
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Results and Discussions 
 
Characteristics of Firms in the Sample  
 
Figure 2 and 3 illustrates the distribution of firms in the sample for the five different types 
and sizes. Further, nearly 40 percent of firms were involved in international markets (i.e., 
exporting). Figure 4 illustrates that “Composting” (31.4 percent), “3R system” (24 percent) 
and “Good Manufacturing Practices” (24 percent) were popular as measures to control solid 
waste generated in the firm as compared to “Bio Gas Unit” (4 percent) and “ISO 14000 
series” (4.6 percent). Out of the 325 firms contacted, however, 153 firms (47.1 percent) did 
not adopt a single SWMP suggested by the MENR.  
 
 
Figure 2: Percentage of Firms by Type 
 
 
Figure 3: Percentage of Firms by Size Page 13 of 19 
 
 
Figure 4:  Different Types of SWMPs Adopted by Firms 
 
Outcome of Count Data Analysis  
 
The first step towards a Count Data Analysis was to examine the excess zeros and over-
dispersion  of  the  data.  The  results  show  that  it  was  distributed  with  a  Mean  (Standard 
Deviation) of 1.153 (± 1.559) (i.e., Variance = ± 2.430). This shows that there is an over-
dispersion. Therefore, it was decided to estimate a model other than the Poisson model in 
which  the  two  are  constrained  to  be  equal.  Also  the  histogram  of  the  response  variable 
obtained (see Figure 7) shows that the number of zeros is excessive. These suggest that it is 
best to estimate the econometric model with other option/s available, including Zero-Inflated 
Poisson (ZIP) and Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB) models that could account for 
this over-dispersion. The statistical outcome of ZIP and ZINB models is presented in Table 1.  
 
The Vuong statistic (V=3.36) compares the ZIP and PR models. Since it is significant, ZIP 
model is preferred the PR model. Where NBM is considered, the Vuong t-test (V=3.00) result 
further suggests that the ZINB outperforms its parent specification, the Negative Binomial 
model (NB). The appropriate model for the data on adoption counts suits more with the ZIP 
or ZINB model. This test is also supported by the Likelihood Ratio (LR) test which tests 
whether  or  not  the  ZINB  model  reduces  to  the  ZIP  model.  The  results  from  this  test 
demonstrate that the LR test statistic computed as LR =−2[LVZIP −LVZINB)], where LV Page 14 of 19 
stands for log-likelihood values and distributed as Chi-square with one degree of freedom, 
favors the ZINB model over the ZIP model. 
 
Table 1: Outcome of the Count Data Models 
 
Covariates  Zero Inflated Poison (ZIP)  Zero Inflated  
Negative Binomial (ZINB) 
  Coe.  SE  Prob.  Coe.  SE  Prob. 
CST  -0.556  0.239  0.020  -0.537  0.288  0.042 
INE  1.170  0.324  0.000  1.235  0.398  0.002 
MRF  -0.403  0.425  0.343  -0.481  0.534  0.368 
REF  1.049  0.434  0.016  1.014  0.5145  0.049 
Constant  -11.433  6.384  0.073  12.511  6.533  0.056 
COP  4.928  1.225  0.000  0.131  0.376  0.027 
ESO  -0.583  0.330  0.077  -0.553  0.384  0.150 
NAB  -0.187  0.252  0.458  -0.172  0.297  0.562 
OPP  -0.759  0.277  0.056  -0.756  0.317  0.067 
PFV  0.132  0.243  0.587  0.131  0.291  0.653 
Large  0.931  0.130  0.000  0.906  0.147  0.000 
Small  0.467  0.211  0.067  0.379  0.241  0.116 
VT   0.937  0.137  0.000  0.921  0.147  0.000 
EX  0.132  0.132  0.174  0.180  0.145  0.214 
Log likelihood  -424.553      -416.511     
Inflation model  logit      logit     
Vuong test  3.36**      3.00 **     
Likelihood Ratio Test        3.01**     
 
The negative sign of the cost in both ZIP and ZINB models implies that the CST acts as a 
negative  factor  hindering  the  adoption  of  the  recommended  SWMPs  in  their  firms 
highlighting the importance of  financial assistance which would aid voluntary adoption. The 
Internal efficiency has a positive impact on adoption as the firms believe that the increase of 
human  resource  efficiency  and  technical  efficiency  are  in  general  their  major  concern 
affecting the implementation as these control measures in place would help the employees to 
handle the production and the disposal measures to comply with the production standards. 
However,  interestingly,  firms  do  not  believe  market  forces  such  as  consumer  pressure, 
increase  in  sales  &  revenue  and  reputation  of  the  firm  to  be  important  factors  affecting 
adoption  as  many  believed  that  having  these  technical  standards  in  the  firms  did  not 
specifically  help  in  competing  in  the  local  or  international  market  nor  increase  in  their 
profitability. Since the waste standard for most exportations are not mandatory, these firms 
including exporting firms did not perceive the adoption necessary to international trade which Page 15 of 19 
gave them very low or no consumer pressure stimulating adoption. Many firms on the other 
hand perceived the regulatory framework to be important and specifically stressed on the 
anticipated regulations to be made mandatory by the government and were responsive to the 
fines  and  compensation  aiming  stricter  regulation  can  increase  the  level  of  disposal  or 
abatement  practices  at  the  firm  level.  Where  the  product  types  are  of  concern,  only  the 
coconut producers had a significant relationship with the rate of adoption. This may be due to 
the fact that most of these firms handle the production from the initial stage to value addition 
in the same location leading to huge amounts of solid waste per day. 
 
However the firm size showed significant impact. In relation to the small scale firms, large 
firms showed a significant adoption rate as many firms required these controls in place for a 
continuous and efficient large scale production. The number of years the firm has been in 
operation  represented  by  the  variable  vintage  showed  a  significant  impact  implying  the 
increase in the sense of responsibility towards cleaner production in the firms over time. 
Whether firm exports its products or not did not pose a significant and positive impact on the 
adoption which may have been due to the fact that waste management methods have not been 
made a requirement in most of the food and beverage products exported from Sri Lanka 
 
The results, in effect, reject the hypothesis that a firm‟s adoption decision is triggered by 
potential losses to the firm resulting from its failure in the market due to non-responsivenes to 
market-based incentives and that this effect is greater than the potential gains to the firm 
resulting from those failures in government policy that would account either for its degree of 
compliance  or  total  non-compliance.  However,  firms  recognized  potential  failures  in 
government policy and inefficiencies associated with the legal system. In sum, it is the less 
significant losses in the market combined with the relatively high gains due to failures in 
government  policy  that  provide  an  opportunity  for  firms,  by  and  large,  to  not  respond 
positively to environment quality  by adopting advanced environmental management controls. 
However,  the  outcome  of  the  analysis  accepts  that  the  relative  strength  of  an  individual 
incentive faced by a firm is not the same across all firms and is associated significantly with 
both the characteristics of the firm and the regulatory regime. 
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Conclusions and Policy Implications  
 
The results of this analysis suggest that it is important to design private and public sector 
initiatives, which aim at achieving a higher level of environmental quality at the level of firm 
that  are  incentive-based  in  order  to  augment  the  low  levels  of  market-based  incentives 
currently prevailing at the firm level. However, such initiatives should factor in the differing 
industry structures and sizes of firms. The results of the analysis can be used to develop a 
common format for decision-making with respect to the level of solid waste management 
controls adopted by the Sri Lankan food processing enterprises, in which both the national 
and provincial governments on one hand allows for producers to take advantage of potential 
market opportunities that exist while strengthening controls by the judicial system on the 
other.  
 
The findings of the study suggest that the firms under study are anticipating much stricter 
regulations  in  the  near  future.  It  is  clear  that  this  perception  on  government  regulation, 
together with their desire to respond to market-based and liability incentives, can effectively 
regulate these firms.  In fact, the differing performance levels of these firms with respect to 
the different solid waste management practices proposed suggest that the majority of firms 
perform  poorly  in  one  or  more  important  areas,  for  example,  in  the  adoption  of  waste 
management  systems  and  audit  procedures  that  are  required  to  assure  a  higher  level  of 
environmental quality. It is therefore imperative that regulations be altered at the provincial 
government level to overcome these shortcomings in the current regulatory system. 
  
The discriminatory behavior of public regulatory bodies at the national and provincial levels 
raises the question as to what criteria are appropriate in controlling the level of environmental 
quality. The government, together with the other sectors in the market (such as industry and 
trade organizations), can act as a facilitator and mediators for firms to develop appropriate 
environmental quality management programs that reflect their private incentives. Trade and 
other industry organizations, as an integral part of the market, can in turn play an extensive 
role in this connection to minimize the problems faced by firms. Policy makers could use the 
„carrot  and  stick‟  approach  suggested  by  Segerson  (1999)  which  imposes  voluntary  and 
mandatory public food safety controls at the firm level as the basis for designing appropriate 
regulation  for  environmental  controls,  which,  in  turn,  could  produce  an  incentive-based 
regulatory system for all firms. An alternative would be a „bottom-to-top‟ approach (i.e., Page 17 of 19 
firm-to-regulator approach) that would reflect the individual incentives faced by firms and 
takes into account the characteristics of firms and of the market in which they operate. 
 
As a ‟stick‟, the government could develop a more stringent „command and control type 
environmental quality management program  for all firms  and apply it irrespective of the 
characteristics  of  the  firm  such  as  its  size  or  whether  it  functions  in  the  domestic  or 
international markets. Hence it is important to bring current public regulatory regimes in 
developing countries like Sri Lanka towards co-regulation, which is practiced by developed 
countries to facilitate businesses to come up with own solutions for environmental and food 
quality, as the outcome of this analysis points out that firms‟ compliance to the recommended 
SWMP was not triggered satisfactorily by the private/voluntary action. This course of action 
could be strengthened with a set of penalties (i.e., fines, license suspension and temporary 
closure, etc.), as well as the emplacement of an effective system to expose those firms that do 
not comply.  This kind of approach may act as an incentive-based regulatory system and at 
the  same  time,  non-compliance  would  entail  the  credible  threat  of  direct  government 
intervention.  Last  but  not  least,  one  of  the  most  important  implications  of  designing 
regulation in this manner is that it provides the right to determine the boundary between the 
market  and  the  government  not  only  to  the  government  but  to  the  market  institutions 
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